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The Hill cipher is a classical symmetric encryption 
algorithm that succumbs to the know-plaintext attack. 
Although its vulnerability to cryptanalysis has rendered it 
unusable in practice, it still serves an important 
pedagogical role in cryptology and linear algebra. In this 
paper, a variant of the Hill cipher is introduced that 
makes the Hill cipher secure while it retains the 
efficiency. The proposed scheme includes a ciphering 




The Hill cipher was invented by L.S. Hill in 1929 [1]. It is 
a famous polygram and a classical symmetric cipher 
based on matrix transformation but it succumbs to the 
known-plaintext attack [2]. Although its vulnerability to 
cryptanalysis has rendered it unusable in practice, it still 
serves an important pedagogical role in both cryptology 
and linear algebra. The Hill cipher is a block cipher that 
has several advantages such as disguising letter 
frequencies of the plaintext, its simplicity because of 
using matrix multiplication and inversion for encryption 
and decryption, and its high speed and high throughput 
[3].  
 Several researches have been done to improve the 
security of the Hill cipher. Yeh et al. [4] used two co-
prime base numbers that are securely shared between the 
participants. Although their scheme thwarts the known-
plaintext attack, it is so time-consuming, requires many 
mathematical manipulations, and is not efficient 
especially when dealing with a bulk of data. Saeednia [5] 
tried to make the Hill cipher secure using some random 
permutations of columns and rows of the key matrix but it 
is proved that his cryptosystem is vulnerable to the 
known-plaintext attack [6], the same vulnerability of the 
original Hill cipher. Lin et al. [6] tried to improve the 
security of the Hill cipher using several random numbers 
generated in a hash chain but their scheme is not efficient. 
Ismail et al. [3] used an initial vector that multiplies 
successively by some orders of the key matrix to produce 
the corresponding key of each block but it has several 
security problems [7].  
 In this paper, a secure cryptosystem is introduced that 
overcomes all the security drawbacks of the Hill cipher. 
The proposed scheme includes an encryption algorithm 
that is a variant of the Affine Hill cipher for which a 
secure cryptographic protocol is introduced. The 
encryption core of the proposed scheme has the same 
structure of the Affine Hill cipher but its internal 
manipulations are different from the previously proposed 
cryptosystems. The rest of this paper is organized as 
follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the Hill cipher. Our 
proposed scheme is introduced and its computational 
costs are evaluated in Section 3, and Section 4 concludes 
the paper. 
 
2. The Hill Cipher 
 
In the Hill cipher, the ciphertext is obtained from the 
plaintext by means of a linear transformation. The 
plaintext row vector X is encrypted as )(mod mXKY   
in which Y is the ciphertext row vector, K is an nn  key 
matrix where mijk   in which m  is ring of integers 
modulo m where m is a natural number that is greater than 
one. The encryption procedure proceeds by encoding the 
resulted ciphertext row vector into alphabets of the main 
plaintext. The value of the modulus m in the original Hill 
cipher was 26 but its value can be optionally selected. 
The key matrix K is supposed to be securely shared 
between the participants. The ciphertext Y is decrypted as 
)(mod m1YKX  . All operations are performed over 
m . 
 For decryption to be possible, the key matrix K should 
be invertible or equivalently, it should satisfy 
1) ), (mod(det  gcd mmK  [2]. However, many of square 
matrices are not invertible over m . The risk of 
determinant having common factors with the modulus can 
be reduced by taking a prime number as the modulus. 
Such selection also increases the keyspace of the 
cryptosystem [8]. 
The security of the Hill cipher depends on 
confidentiality of the key matrix K and its rank n. When n 
is unknown and the modulus m is not too large, the 
opponent could simply try successive values of n until he 
founds the key. If the guessed value of n was incorrect, 
the obtained key matrix would be disagreed with further 
plaintext-ciphertext pairs. The most important security 
flaw of the Hill cipher is regarded to its vulnerability to 
the known-plaintext attack. It can be broken by taking 
just n distinct pairs of plaintext and ciphertext [2]. In this 
kind of attack, the cryptanalyst possesses the plaintext of 
some messages and the corresponding ciphertext of those 
messages. He will try to deduce the key or an algorithm to 
decrypt any new messages encrypted with the same key. 
The Affine Hill cipher extends the concept of Hill 
cipher by mixing it with a nonlinear affine transformation 
[2] so the encryption expression will have the form of 
)(mod mVXKY  . In this paper, we extend such 
concept to introduce a secure variant of the Hill cipher. 
 
3. The Proposed Scheme 
 
The proposed cryptosystem includes a ciphering core that 
is depicted in Figure 1, and a one-pass protocol which is 
shown in Figure 2. The encryption core has the same 
structure of the Affine Hill cipher but in order to give 
more randomization to the introduced scheme and to 
strengthen it against the common attacks, each block of 
data is encrypted using a random number. For avoiding 
multiple random number generations, only one random 
number is generated at the beginning of encryption and 
the corresponding random number of the following data 
blocks is recursively generated using a one-way hash 
function in a hash chain, as it is depicted in Figure 1. The 
basic random number that is generated prior to the 
encryption should be securely shared between the 
participants. This can be done using the introduced one-
pass protocol that is depicted in Figure 2 where the 
encryption and decryption procedures should be followed 
from Figure 1. The steps will be: 
 
1. Alice secretly selects random integers 0a  and b 
where 10 0  pa   and 21 nb   in which n is 
the rank of the key matrix. She computes 
)(mod0 pkar ij  where  nbi   and 
)1(  inbj  in which  .  denotes the ceiling. 
She encodes the plaintext     message     into     
some     row     vectors ]...[ 21 nxxxX . For 
the tth block of data to be encrypted ( ,...2,1t ), she 
computes    ta     with   a   recursive   expression  as  
 
Figure 1. Ciphering core of the proposed scheme 
 
 
Figure 2. A protocol for the proposed scheme 
 
)( 1 tt aHa  in which H(.) denotes the one-way 
hash  function.  If  ta   is   invertible    mod  p,   i.e. 
)(mod0 pat  , she puts )(mod0 pav t .   
Otherwise,    she    puts    10 v . She produces the 
row vector ]...[ 21 nvvvV  with the 
recursive expression as )(mod~ 1 pavkv tiiji   for 
ni ,...,1  and 1)mod( 1   nvj i , in which 1~ iv  is 
defined as     )2mod(2~ 2/12/1    ii vv  where 
  1log 12  iv  denotes the bit-length of 1iv   
and  .  indicates the floor. She then encrypts all the 
plaintext vectors as )(mod0 pv VXKY  . She 
repeats the procedure until all blocks of plaintext 
become encrypted. 
 
2. Bob computes )(mod1 pku ij
  and 
)(mod0 prua   in which  nbi   and 
)1(  inbj . He uses 0a  for decrypting the 
ciphertext as )(mod)( 110 pv
  KVYX , as it is 
depicted in Figure 1. 
 
The introduced protocol is a one-pass protocol that is 
designed for the proposed cryptosystem. As a one-pass 
protocol, it does not have any explicit authentication step 
but it is secure, and does not reveal any secret 
information. It is so suitable for situations where both of 
participants are not online. 
 
The introduced expression for generating the elements 
of vector V as )(mod~ 1 pavkv tiiji   and defining 1~ iv  as 
   )2mod(2~ 2/12/1    ii vv  takes advantages of ideas 
behind the MQV key-exchange protocols [9]. 1
~
iv  is 
simply computed by taking the least significant half in 
binary representation of 1iv  and such definition will 
decrease the computational costs and consequently, 
increases the efficiency [9]. 
 The proposed cryptosystem neutralizes all the security 
drawbacks of the Hill cipher. It thwarts the known-
plaintext attack since n equations cannot be used for 
solving an unknown nn  matrix and 2n unknown 
parameters. Choosing a large prime number p as the 
modulus extremely enhances the keyspace so the brute-
force or equivalently, the ciphertext-only attack does not 
have any benefit for the attacker. The random number 
after a secure transmission is recursively encoded with the 
one-way hash function so it differs for each block of 
plaintext. The chosen-ciphertext and chosen-plaintext 
attacks are also thwarted since the random number 0a  
that its knowledge is essential for such attacks, is 
exchanged through a secure protocol.  
 
3.1. Computational Costs 
 
Let EncT  and DecT  denote the running time for encryption 
and decryption of each block of data respectively. By 
neglecting the computational costs of the introduced 
protocol and the required computations of computing the 
inverse key matrix that is used for decryption, we have: 
 
HashAddMulEnc TTnnTnnT  )1()2(~ 22   (1) 
 
InvHashAddMulDec TTTnnTnnT  )1()2(~ 22  (2) 
 
in which HashT  is the running time for the hash 
calculations, and MulT , AddT  and InvT  are the time needed 
for the scalar modular multiplication, addition, and 
inverse calculations respectively. Total required number 
of operations for computing SHA-1 and MD5 hash 
functions are calculated as 1110 and 744 operations 
respectively [10]. Each of MulT , AddT  and InvT  requires 
different number of operations. Let   1log2  p  
denotes the bit-length of modulus p. Using the 
conventional methods, the running time for calculating a 
modular addition, modular multiplication, and modular 
inverse will be of [11]: 
 
 
)(OTAdd       (3) 
)( 2OTMul       (4) 
)( 3OTInv       (5) 
There are also many fast algorithms for the 
computations [12] but we consider the time complexity of 
conventional methods since it corresponds with the worst 
situation and anyone can decrease the required number of 
operations by deploying faster algorithms. The 
computational complexity of the proposed scheme for 
encrypting and decrypting each block of data can be 
simply estimated by substituting expressions (3-5) into 
(1) and (2). The running time for encryption and 
decryption of each block of data explicitly depends on 
 (the bit-length of modulus p) and n (the rank of the key 
matrix). The size of modulus p depends on the number of 
deployed alphabets in the plaintext. 
Let L denotes the number of letters in the plaintext. 
Total processing time for enciphering the whole blocks of 
plaintext is: 
 HashAddMulEncTotal TTnnTnnnLT  )1()2(~ 22_  
        (6)  
 
while the running time for decrypting the whole 
ciphertext is: 
 InvHashAddMulDecTotal TTTnnTnnnLT  )1()2(~ 22_  
        (7) 
 
 The computational costs of the proposed scheme for 
encryption/decryption of all blocks of data can be simply 
calculated by substituting expressions (3-5) into (6) and 
(7). Figure 3 depicts the effects of rank value of the key 
matrix on the total number of operations for encipherment 
/decipherment of the whole plaintext/ciphertext that is 
obtained using (6) and (7) for 1000L  and 257p . 
The size effects of the modulus p on the total number of 
operations for encipherment/decipherment of the whole 
plaintext/ciphertext is also depicted in Figure 4 that is 
obtained using (6) and (7) for 1000L  and 4n . It is 
noteworthy that the waves in Figure 3 are according to 
the introduced ceiling function in (6) and (7) while the 
steps in Figure 4 are due to logarithmic relationship 
between the modulus p and its bit-length  . Table 1 
gives a comparison between the required number of 
operations for encrypting/decrypting each block of data in 
the proposed scheme and those of the other schemes. It 
shows that the computational cost of the proposed scheme 
is slightly more than that of the Affine Hill cipher so it is 
computationally efficient while it thwarts the security 
vulnerabilities of the Hill cipher.  
 
Figure 3. Total number of operations required for 
encrypting a plaintext of L=1000 letters for 




Figure 4. Total number of operations required for 
encrypting a plaintext of L=1000 letters for 
different modulo p and a fixed rank value (n=4). 
 
Table 1. Computational costs of different 
schemes for encryption/decryption of each block 
of data 
Different 
Schemes Operation MulT  AddT  InvT HashT
Original Hill 
Cipher 
Encryption 2n  nn 2  - - 
Decryption 2n  nn 2  - - 
Affine Hill 
Cipher 
Encryption 2n  2n  - - 
Decryption 2n  2n  - - 
Lin et al.'s 
Scheme [6] 
Encryption 32  nn  42 n  - 1n
Decryption 32  nn  42 n  1 1n
The Proposed 
Scheme 
Encryption nn 22   12  nn  - 1 
Decryption nn 22   12  nn  1 1 
4. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, a symmetric cryptosystem is introduced that 
is actually a secure variant of the Affine Hill cipher. It 
includes a ciphering core for which a one-pass 
cryptographic protocol is introduced. The outer structure 
of the ciphering core is similar to the Affine Hill cipher 
but its inner manipulations are different. Each block of 
data is encrypted using a different random number that is 
generated using a chained hash function. The proposed 
cryptosystem thwarts the known-plaintext, chosen-
ciphertext, and chosen-plaintext attacks. Since the 
modulus is a prime number, the keyspace is greatly 
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